
Ben Shepherd, Glasgow Caledonian University

Whilst the author made every effort to provide fully accurate information throughout the text and endnotes of this book, since submission of the final proofs of the book, various inaccuracies have been spotted by the author which are corrected in this document.

A small number of points (listed under ‘Outstanding’) remain to be checked; this will be done when the author has the opportunity again to access the relevant works between now and the end of September 2016.

INTRODUCTION

NOTES

1. Quotation is from Förster, ‘Ideological Warfare in Germany 1919 to 1945,’ p. 517.

29. Correct references are Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, p. 15; Strohn, The German Army and the Defence of the Reich, p. 182.

30. Correct reference is Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, pp. 15-16.

CHAPTER ONE

TEXT

P9, para 2, line 1. On Blomberg directing the army’s troops to view SS men as ‘comrades,’ see Mitcham, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Werner von Blomberg,’ p. 32.

P13, para 2, lines 15-19. This final point is not one that Rutherford himself makes explicitly, but it is consistent with and informed by his argument. Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, pp. 35-7.

NOTES

9. Quotation is from p. 196, not p. 194.

17. Correct reference is pp. 72-3, not p. 72.

37. Quotation is from p. 509, not p. 508.


OUTSTANDING

72. Correct reference still needed.

CHAPTER TWO

TEXT

**P26, para 2, line 3.**
The correct figure, which Maiolo cites, is twenty-one billion francs for the armed forces as a whole. Maiolo, *Cry Havoc*, p. 182.

**P30, para 1.**
Though Macksey does argue that Jodl fell under Hitler’s ideological sway, he does not attribute this to the time Jodl spent dining in Hitler’s presence. He points out that Jodl, as a bon vivant, must have found it difficult to dine with a teetotal non-smoker who followed a strict dietary regime. Macksey, ‘Generaloberst Alfred Jodl,’ p. 106.

**P37, para 3, lines 8-9.**
Giziowski’s wording is slightly ambiguous, but it appears that the figure of 5,000 was for the protectorate as a whole rather than for Prague specifically. Giziowski, *The Enigma of General Blaskowitz*, p. 107.

**P38, para 1, lines 7-9.**
Wegner does not specify the particular point in time to which the figure of 26,000 applies, though it was certainly at some point between the winter of 1938-39 and the outbreak of war. Wegner, *The Waffen-SS*, p. 122.

**P38, para 2, bottom line.**
Quotation should read ‘fanatical faith in final victory,’ not ‘fanatical faith in victory’.

**P39, para 4, line 6.**
The figure of 8 per cent was for the entire armed forces, rather than just the army, though it can be assumed that the vast majority of this figure was allocated to the army. Overy, *War and Economy in the Third Reich*, p. 196.

NOTES


35. Correct reference is pp. 152-5, not p. 152.

39. Quotation is from p. 165, not p. 164.

50. Correct Hartmann reference is pp. 103-4, not pp. 102-3.

53. Quotation is from pp. 230-1, not p. 230.


73. Quotation is from p. 519, not p. 518.

OUTSTANDING

7. Provenance of ‘hysterical old maid’ reference needs checking.

CHAPTER THREE

TEXT

P45, para 2, lines 6-7.
The Poles did not possess any armoured divisions, but rather just one mechanized brigade. McNab, Hitler’s Armies, p. 66.

P46, para 1, lines 15-16.
Rohde places more emphasis on desertion by ethnic German troops of the Polish army before the campaign, who then fled across the Polish frontier. Rohde, ‘Hitler’s First Blitzkrieg,’ p. 98.

P51, para 2, line 8.
The specific night in question was 4/5 September. Boehler, Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg, pp. 173-4.

P51, para 3, lines 8-9.
This is incorrect; the figure of 1,000 cited here is for the town of Bydgoszcz in the Polish Corridor, rather than for the corridor as a whole. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland, pp. 62-3.
**P53, para 1, line 1.**

The original directive was issued in August 1938, but did not come into force until August of the following year, with war imminent. Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 100.

**P54, para 1, line 8.**

Schenckendorff’s order appears to have been even harsher than this. Rossino states that Schenckendorff ‘ordered the execution of ten hostages for every German soldier shot.’ The term ‘every German soldier shot’ may have encompassed German soldiers killed and wounded, not just German soldiers killed. Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, p. 129.

**P54, para 3.**

The aerial bombardment was not intended to replace a ground assault entirely, but rather to work in tandem with it, in a somewhat limited capacity, so as to reduce German army casualties. Rohde, ‘Hitler’s First Blitzkrieg,’ p. 122.

**P57, para 1.**

The unit in question was VIII Corps, not VII Corps. Both Jews and Poles were forced to spend the night in the church. It is unclear whether the German soldiers firing shots were standing outside or inside the church. The Jews were forced to pluck the grass from between the paving stones, not chew it. Boehler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg*, p. 190.

**P57, para 2, line 7.**

It is unclear whether the eyewitness was a Pole, or a Polish Jew. The latter seems more likely.

**P57, para 4, lines 5-6.**

Himmler was not actually this explicit about Hitler’s ordering of the killings, but his new appointment was a clear signal to the army that he had Hitler’s full backing. In any case, Hitler had already confirmed to Brauchitsch on 20 September that the Einsatzgruppen were implementing ‘certain radical measures’. Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, p. 117.

**P59, para 1, line 7.**

More accurately, Hitler was already unenthusiastic about the idea when Frank consulted with him, due to his belief that the Red Army would not attack ‘for a hundred years.’ In short, Frank used Hitler’s backing to get the idea kicked into the long grass. Then the rapid victory over France in 1940 and Hitler’s growing inclination to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 made the notion of a defensive wall in Poland redundant. Müller, *Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik*, pp. 121-2.

**NOTES**


5. Correct reference is pp. 96-8, not pp. 96-7.


38. Correct reference is p. 182, not p. 181.

63. Correct reference is p. 190, not p. 199.

65. Quotation is not from Boehler, but from Rossino, *Hitler Strikes Poland*, p. 176.

CHAPTER FOUR

TEXT

*P67, para 4, lines 5-6.*
There were actually three French armoured divisions in operation by the time of the invasion, though a fourth was hastily formed on 15 May. However, all these divisions, together with the light mechanized divisions, were thinned out with less powerful vehicles designed to accompany infantry. Jackson, *The Fall of France*, p. 24.

*P69, para 1, line 4.*

NOTES


11. Correct reference is pp. 82-5, not pp. 82-4.


CHAPTER FIVE

TEXT

P77, para 2.
It is incorrect to state that the 267th Infantry Division was the only army formation containing troops who killed large numbers of civilians. On 27 May, men of the 225th Infantry Division killed 86 civilians in Vinkt in Belgium. Both this incident, and the killings that took place the following day in the 267th’s area, may have happened in part because the troops involved were particularly jumpy. For more detailed explanation, see Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?, pp. 16-18.

P78, para 1, lines 2-4.
Quote should start at ‘conducted’.

P79, bottom line.
Quote should read ‘the crew of a howitzer battery’, not ‘the Kruger howitzer battery’ (transcription error).

P81, para 3, line 5.
Hitler’s stated reasoning was confined to the point about canals, rather than about fighting in the town also. Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945, p. 296.

P82 bottom line – p83, top two lines
The Death’s Head figures are incorrect. Between 20 and 28 May the Death’s Head may have killed up to 264 civilians, though a number of these may have been killed indirectly in the course of the fighting. The Death’s Head also killed 121 captured Allied soldiers in total. Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?, pp. 15-18.

P84, para 1, lines 1-2.
The Grossdeutschland was a regiment at this time, not a division. It was attached to the 10th Panzer Division during the invasion. Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims, p. 37.

P85, para 4, lines 1-2.
The 50,000 figure of German dead and missing was for the entire campaign, not for Operation Red. The 70,000 figure is incorrect. Frieser, The Blitzkrieg Legend, p. 318.

P85, para 4, line 6.
The correct figure is 90,000, not 99,000. Nord, France 1940, p. 99.

P86, para 4, lines 1-4.
This view was expressed by General Hoepner, not General Heinrici, though the latter expressed similar views on the fall of France. Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, p. 173.

NOTES

2.
Correct Umbreit reference is p. 283, not p. 82.

6.
Correct reference is p. 342, not pp. 342-4.

7.
Correct reference is p. 450, not p. 452.


35. Reference should be for p. 91 only, not pp. 91-3.

40. Correct reference is pp. 443-4, not p. 443.

46. Correct reference is p. 445, not p. 444.


56. Correct Frieser reference is p. 350, not p. 315.


74. Hürter does not give a precise figure for the number of promotions to colonel general, but names ten individuals ‘among others’. Hürter, *Hitlers Heerführer*, p. 174.

76. This quote came from Hoepner, not Heinrici. Hürter, *Hitlers Heerführer*, p. 173.

OUTSTANDING

*P67, para 3, lines 11-12.*
Mark III figures need checking.

CHAPTER SIX

TEXT

*P94, para 1, line 4.*
Only the GFP’s officers/officials came from the Gestapo or the Criminal Police, both of which operated under Heydrich’s Security Police. NCOs and rank-and-file personnel came from the Wehrmacht. Förster, *Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat*, p. 82.

*P94, para 2, lines 15-16.*
This is actually a quote in a letter from the Military Command in Paris to Jodl. Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 290.

*P95, para 2, lines 2-4.*
Although this figure applies to a point during the period following the Germans’ military takeover of the ‘free zone’ of southern France in November 1942, it is not entirely clear which month or period it specifically applies to. In March 1942, the Germans deployed 20,000 officers, NCOs and men in this capacity across occupied France. Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?*, p. 56.

*P95, para 3, lines 10-15.*
These last two points are not made explicitly by Conway or Warmbrunn.
This is incorrectly attributed as a direct quote, though it certainly conveys the field marshal’s view. Meinen, *Wehrmacht und Prostitution im besetzten Frankreich*, pp. 73-4.


The figure for quartering was 10 million RM per month, not per day. Umbreit, ‘Towards Continental Dominion,’ p. 302.

It is not clear exactly whereabouts in the café the caricature was drawn or found.


The correct date of this document is 22 August 1940, not 26 August 1940. Happe et al., *Die Verfolgung der europäischen Juden, Band 5*, p. 592.

The correct title is General Commissariat, not General Secretariat. Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 204.

Brauchitsch did not give explicit authority at this stage, but his agreement with Himmler provided loopholes that did enable the Security Police and SD to make arrests. Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 67.

Breendonk was not set up by the SS and Police, but they were responsible for its operation. Warmbrunn, *The German Occupation of Belgium 1940–1944*, pp. 116-20.

7. Correct reference is pp. 44-5, not p. 44.

8. Correct Förster reference is p. 82, not pp. 87, 89.


17. Quotation is from p. 35, not p. 34.

34. Correct reference is p. 69, not p. 63.
Correct reference is p. 9, not p. 35.

Correct reference is pp. 49-53, not pp. 49-51.

The actual quotation is from p. 290.

Correct reference is p. 60, not p. 56.

Quotation is from p. 126, not p. 127.

Correct reference is pp. 139-42, not pp. 139-41.

Correct reference is p. 215, not p. 213.

Correct reference is p. 204, not p. 203.

Correct reference is p. 215, not p. 213.


Correct reference for Falkenhausen’s preventative custody policy needs checking.

**CHAPTER SEVEN**

Some corrections to these figures are needed. Luther cites a figure of five million men for the German army as a whole on the eve of Barbarossa, but does not provide specific figures for the field army and Replacement Army. However, he does state that the army committed nearly three quarters of its total force structure to the invasion, which more or less corresponds to the 3.8 million figure. Luther puts the strength of the Soviet Union’s entire defence establishment at over five million on the eve of Barbarossa. He puts the crucial figure for field forces in the western frontier zone at about 2.9 million, but this figure excludes the Stavka’s extensive reserves, together with forces in the remaining military districts and the Far Eastern Front. These together comprised an additional 140 divisions, together with three separate brigades, 81 separate regiments and sixteen fortified regions. Overall, going by these figures, it would be correct to assert that, overall, the Germans slightly outnumbered the Soviets at the outset of the campaign. Mawdsley concurs with this overall view. Luther, *Barbarossa Unleashed*, pp. 112-13, 144-5; Mawdsley, *Thunder in the East*, pp. 18-19.
P114, para 1, lines 3-4.
‘(T)he mainstay of Red Army manpower was peasant stock’ is a somewhat imprecise statement; rather, as Mawdsley points out, ‘most of the Red Army’s conscripts [my emphasis (BS)] came from the countryside.’ Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, quotation from p. 30.

P115, para 1, lines 1-2.
These were also referred to as army group commanders. The correct year is 1942, not 1940. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 617.

P115, para 5, lines 3-4.
These figures are incorrect. In June 1941 there were twenty Panzer divisions. In August 1941, the 21st Panzer Division was formed. Of the army’s twenty-one Panzer divisions in August 1941, two were committed to North Africa and two were being reorganized and refitted, which left seventeen Panzer divisions for the campaign in the Soviet Union. Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, p. 115.

P118, para 1, line 2.
The correct figure was 100 to 1,000, rather than 1 to 2,000 (transcription error). Kroener, ‘The Manpower Resources of the Third Reich,’ p. 977.

P120, para 4, last line.
‘Obstacles’ is a better translation than ‘objections’ in this context.

P123, para 1, line 6.
Quote should read ‘Jewish Bolshevism’, not ‘Judeo-Bolshevism’.

P125, para 3, line 10.
Rather, Rutherford’s point is that Wagner’s fear about spoiled meat deliveries was realized. Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, p. 109.

P126, para 2.
Incorporation of POWs into the policy was actually discussed at the 2 May meeting, of which the 23 May directive was essentially the written-up version. The figure of twenty to thirty million Soviet civilians starving to death was Backe’s own estimate, but was not specified in the directive. Kay, Exploitation, Resettlement, Mass Murder, pp. 124; Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, p. 479.

P128, para 2, lines 2-4.
The full correct translation is ‘gives practically every soldier the right to shoot at any Russian whom he believes to be an irregular, or whom he alleges to be an irregular, from the front or from behind’.

P129, para 2, lines 1-7.
The correct division was the 102nd Infantry, not the 62nd Infantry, and its commander was Major General John Ansat. Ansat’s main approach was not to restrict authority for ordering the division’s troops to execute condemned commissars, but rather to have such commissars transferred to the SD, the GFP or the Wehrmacht’s Feldgendarmerie for execution. Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl, p. 176.

P129, para 3; p130, para 1.
Römer points out that the intelligence officer may have added this comment to the report retrospectively, after the effects of the order had become fully apparent. Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl, p. 174.
**P132, para 2, line 3.**
The correct place name is Donji Dobric, not Donji Donbric.

**NOTES**

6. Correct references are pp. 64, 71-6, not pp. 60, 71-5.

7. Correct Pahl reference is p. 79, not p. 78.

8. Correct reference is p. 64, not p. 60.

10, 11. ‘The original report is so vaguely worded that bracketed inserts are provided here for clarification.’ This sentence belongs in endnote 10, not endnote 11.

17. Correct references are pp. 59-60, 90; not 56-62, 91-2.

18. Pp. 35-7 are from Merridale, *Ivan’s War*.


27. This endnote applies to both this paragraph and the previous one. Correct Stahel reference is p. 115, not pp. 107-14.


40. Correct Stahel reference is pp. 54-60, not p. 56.

52. Quotation is from p. 227, not p. 228.

54. Quotation is from p. 215, not p. 214.

56. Quotation is from p. 229, not p. 231.

58. Quotations are from p. 216, not p. 215.


76. Correct Förster reference is p. 61, not p. 59.

78. Quotation is from p. 233, not p. 231.

79. Quotation is from p. 233, not p. 231.

81. Correct reference is p. 71, not pp. 70-1.

82. Correct reference is p. 70, not pp. 70-1.


89. Correct references are pp. 160 and 514, not pp. 154 and 160.

90. Correct reference is p. 176, not p. 170.


92. Correct reference is pp. 430-1, not p. 430.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TEXT

**P134, para 2, lines 7-8.**
These should be square rather than rounded brackets as they are not part of the original quote.

**P135, para 4, line 4.**
The correct figure was 171 divisions, not 271 divisions (transcription error). Glantz and House, *When Titans Clashed*, p. 39.

**P137, para 3, line 1.**
The figure of 324,000 includes those captured in the Bialystok pocket. Mawdsley, *Thunder in the East*, p. 73.

**P139, para 2, lines 9-11.**
Later series of the Panzer IV had armour that, on parts of the casing, was slightly thicker than that of the T-34. Stahel, *Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East*, p. 112.
P142, para 1.
The edition of Blücher quoted here is from 1 August 1941, not June 1941. Römer, Der Kommissarbefehl, p. 308.

P152, para 1, lines 1-3.
The specific assumption was that the Red Army’s fear of a Japanese attack would compel it to retain forces in the Far East. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, p. 112.

P153, para 2, line 10.
Line should read ‘only one sixth’ rather than ‘only sixteen’. (transcription error)

P154, para 3, lines 14-15.
Glantz refers to the 100-series of tank divisions, not a hundred tank divisions in total (transcription error).

P155, para 2, line 4.
309,000, not 300,000, were taken prisoner inside the Smolensk pocket. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 71.

P157, para 3, lines 6-7.
The eastward movement of enterprises took place in two phases, the second of which commenced in September 1941, but it is not clear when that second phase was completed by. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 48.

NOTES

1. Quotation is from pp. 539-40, not p. 539.


15. Correct reference is p. 73, not p. 72.

21. Reference should be for pp. 82-3, not p. 83.

25. Quotation is from p. 290, not pp. 290-1.


39. Quotation is from p. 290, not pp. 290-1.

60. Quotation is from pp. 332-3, not p. 332.

62. Correct reference is Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 672.

78. Quotation is from pp. 92-3, not p. 91.


80. Quotation is from p. 89, not p. 88, as is the reference to the Seventeenth Army.
90. Correct reference is p. 659, not p. 657.
104. Correct reference is p. 145, not p. 45.
105. Correct reference is Megargee, *Inside Hitler’s High Command*, p. 112. Ignore all other references in this endnote.
119. Quotation is from p. 178, not p. 78.
136. Correct references are Stahel, *Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East*, pp. 244-5, 275-7.

**OUTSTANDING**

60. Correct reference needs checking.

**CHAPTER NINE**

**TEXT**

*P163, para 2, lines 14-16.* The engagement involving the two regiments took place on a different occasion during the battle of Dnepropetrovsk. Wettstein, *Wehrmacht im Stadtkampf*, p. 167.

*P164, para 2, lines 7-8.* The figure of fifty thousand killed was for the German army across the eastern front as a whole during the month of September, though the battle of Kiev did account for the great majority of this figure. Stahel, *Kiev 1941*, p. 353.
P164, para 2, lines 11-15.
The two casualty figures here contradict one another. The correct figure for total
casualties to the end of September is 583,000, which is the one provided by
Rutherford. However, Overmans’ figures for total dead on the Eastern Front do
demonstrate that German casualties during the first three-month period were worse
than during the second three-month period. The figure for 22 June to the end of
September is 185,198, and the figure from 1 October to 31 December 117,297.
Rutherford, Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, p. 200; Overmans, Deutsche
militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 277.

P166, para 3, line 8.
The weekly bread ration was 1.5 kilograms, not half a kilogram. Pohl, Die Herrschaft
der Wehrmacht, p. 187.

P172, para 2, line 12.
There was in fact one large fire, rather than three. Longerich, Holocaust, p. 224.

P172, para 2, line 16.
The age range of the Jews who were shot was 14 to 60, not 40 to 60 (transcription
error). Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, p. 675.

P172, para 2, lines 19-20.
Police Battalion 314 sealed off the area, but Sonderkommando 4a killed the majority
of the victims using machine guns. A gas van was also used. Angrick, ‘Das Beispiel
Charkow,’ pp. 122-4.

P174, para 3, lines 9-11.
This order was issued by Bechtolsheim, not von der Osten, though it is likely that the

P181, para 1, line 7.
Quote should read ‘Wehrmacht’, not ‘Eastern Army’.

P185, para 4, line 4.
Stahel correctly refers to the western military districts in the plural. Stahel, The Battle
of Moscow, p. 316.

NOTES
6, 7.
Correct reference for both is pp. 49-53, not pp. 49-50 or 51.

10.
Correct reference is Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 301-2.

12.
Ignore Stahel, Kiev 1941, pp. 9 and 53 references. Correct Stahel, Kiev 1941 reference
is p. 353.

47.
Correct Longerich, Holocaust reference is p. 253, not pp. 251-3.

48.
Quotation is from Shepherd, War in the Wild East, pp. 88-9.

58.
Ignore Hasenclever reference.
60.
Correct reference is pp. 481-2, not p. 482.

67.
Correct Hürter reference is pp. 597-8, not pp. 697-8.

73.
Correct reference is p. 200, not p. 201.

85.
Correct reference is p. 399, not pp. 394-5.

87.
Correct reference is pp. 400-2, not pp. 399-400.

95.
Correct reference is pp. 71-8, not pp. 71-3.

113.

114.
Quotation is from p. 315, not p. 314.

118.
Correct Mawdsley reference is p. 109, not p. 178.

CHAPTER TEN

TEXT

**P191, para 2, lines 7-8.**

**P191, para 3, line 4.**
The statement that regional commanders could execute hostages is incorrect; this was the preserve of the Military Commander in Paris. Laub, *After the Fall*, pp. 103-4.

**P193, para 2, lines 3-4.**
The correct name of the hotel was the Hôtel du Midi (transcription error). The Luftwaffe major was wounded, not killed. Laub, *After the Fall*, pp. 155-7.

**P194, para 1.**
Regarding the question of how much Stülpnagel did or did not know, it is also possible that rumours of mass shootings in the east, such as the Babi Yar massacre, had filtered through to him. Herbert, ‘The German Military Command in Paris and the Deportation of the French Jews,’ p. 151. Lieb contests this, however. Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?*, p. 28.

**P194, paras 1 and 2.**
Stülpnagel was ordered by the OKW to transport 1,500 Jews and ‘young communists’ on 12 December. He did not explicitly agree to this, but he did not protest against it at the time. It was in a report to the OKW on 15 January 1942 that he made his argument that they should take place once transportation problems had been solved. Laub, *After the Fall*, pp. 157, 160.
This point was reached in the spring of 1943, rather than the end of 1942. Umbreit, ‘German Rule in the Occupied Territories,’ p. 246.

NOTES

Chapter title should read ‘Southeast Europe’ rather than ‘Balkans’.


6. Correct reference is pp. 128-9, not p. 128.

8. Quotation is from p. 139, not p. 137.


34. Quotation is from pp. 102-3, not p. 86.

OUTSTANDING


25. The correct number of famine-related deaths needs checking.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

TEXT

This is incorrect. The first quote is from Walter Görlitz, one of Model’s biographers. The second is a misquote due to a transcription error. Correct reference is pp. 604-5, not p. 604.

This April 1942 quote was actually from Model himself, describing his chief of staff, Colonel Hans Krebs. Stein, A Flawed Genius, p. 84.
P212, last line.
The correct spelling is Scheibe, not Scheiber. Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl*, p. 468.

P214, para 2, line 12.
The correct date is 13 November, not 23 November. Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, p. 590.

P214, para 4, lines 9-11.
The measure the OKH announced in December 1941, one that came far too late, was not to introduce delousing stations, but to quarantine the affected camps. Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, p. 602.

NOTES


38. Ignore this endnote; endnote 39 applies to the points referred to by this one.

42. Correct reference is p. 589, not p. 586.


44. Correct reference is p. 468, not p. 469.

45. Correct reference is pp. 455-6, not p. 455.

46. Correct reference is p. 583, not p. 582.

52. Ignore p. 586 reference.

54. Correct reference is p. 599, not p. 596.


58. Quotation is from p. 391, not p. 386.

63. Ignore Streit reference.


OUTSTANDING

Specifically, water supplies could be drawn from karst springs and wells. But it was particularly difficult to obtain water in eastern Cyrenaica, where it had to be drilled for in dried-up riverbeds (wadis) and was brackish and not very palatable. Stumpf, ‘The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942-1943,’ pp. 632-3.

Axis paratroop forces, rather than German paratroop forces specifically. The Italian 2nd Parachute Division ‘Folgore’ had been prepared for an assault on Crete, but the Germans’ Ramcke Parachute Brigade had already been serving in North Africa since April 1942. Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring, p. 128; http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Personenregister/R/RamckeHB.htm, accessed 4.7.16.

Quote should read ‘We’re simply being crushed by the enemy weight,’ not ‘We seem to be crushed by the enemy weight.’ (transcription error).

The landings actually took place on 8 November, four days after the end of the battle, though they certainly added to the urgency of retreat for the Axis forces.

NOTES


20. Ignore Stegemann references. Correct French reference is p. 224 only.


38. Correct reference is p. 74, not p. 75.


51. Correct reference is pp. 692-5, not pp. 700-2. Ritchie also hoped to buy time in which the Eighth Army might rebuild. Ibid.
56. Correct reference is pp. 703-5, not p. 704.


60. Ratcliff, p. 41 refers specifically to the achievements of Rommel’s radio monitoring company rather than to its limitations.

61. Correct reference is p. 95, not p. 94.


68. Quotation is from pp. 244-5, not p. 244.


73. Correct references are pp. 247-8, 254; not pp. 248-9, 256-7.


84. Correct reference is p. 153, note 120, not p. 152.

85. Quotation is from pp. 138-9, not p. 138.

OUTSTANDING

15. Correct reference needs checking.

48. Correct reference needs checking.

77. Correct reference needs checking.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

TEXT

P242, para 1, lines 11-12.
This is incorrectly attributed as a direct quote, though it certainly conveys Wegner’s overall argument.

P243, para 2, line 4.
Kershaw does not actually state the specific date, but the remark would have been made in either April or early May.
P243, para 3.
Kershaw’s account of Hitler’s optimism actually relates to his frame of mind in June 1942, not April 1942. Rommel’s new advance in North Africa did not begin until May 1942. Nevertheless, there at least appeared, at any rate, to be good grounds for optimism throughout the April to June period.

P244, para 2, line 12.
The December 1941 figure was 170,000, not 270,000. Kroener, ‘The Manpower Resources of the Third Reich,’ p. 1027.

P245, para 1.
This development set in from 1942, not 1940, but as such it remains just as relevant for this chapter. Müller, *Hitlers Wehrmacht*, p. 106.

P245, para 2, lines 10-12.
The manpower from the regiments or battalions of second order divisions was re-distributed across the army in general, rather than within the division itself. Rutherford, *Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front*, p. 295.

P246, para 4, lines 2-3.
The correct quotation comprises ‘in crass contrast’ only. Pahl, *Fremde Heere Ost*, p. 91.

P257, para 2, line 11.
The statement that most non-working civilians were dumped on the Kalmuk steppe is wrong. Dumping large numbers of non-working civilians on the steppe was certainly the plan, but the military situation prevented it from being carried out. Had it been carried out, moreover, the Germans still intended to direct some provisions towards the affected civilians. In the event, the Sixth Army tried to provide for non-working civilians from its own supplies, though there were serious limits to how far it was able to do this. Lübbers, ‘Die 6. Armee und die Zivilbevölkerung von Stalingrad’, p. 122.

P258, para 1, line 2.
The two corps in question were VIII and XIV, not VII and XIV. Glantz and House, *Armageddon in Stalingrad*, p. 705.

P260, para 2, line 8.
‘Bomb craters’ is a better translation than ‘bomb damage’.

P268, para 2, lines 13-14.
Later, on 28 November, Manstein adopted a negative assessment of the Luftwaffe’s ability to keep the Sixth Army supplied. Glantz and House, *Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two*, p. 11.

P271, para 1.
Soviet ground attacks, while using massed infantry and armour, were nevertheless judiciously timed in order to help minimize casualties. Glantz and House, *Endgame at Stalingrad, Book Two*, p. 599.

NOTES
8.
Correct reference is p. 1027, not p. 1026.

12.
Correct reference is p. 106, not p. 104.
18. Correct reference is p. 36, not p. 35.
52. Correct reference is pp. 41-4, not pp. 38-40.
53. Correct reference is pp. 100-2, not p. 102.
55. Correct reference is p. 74, not p. 73.
64. Correct reference is pp. 17-18, not p. 119.
70. Correct reference is pp. 482-3, not p. 482.
112. Ignore Glantz reference.
116. Correct reference is pp. 299-300, not p. 299.
121. Correct reference is pp. 9-11, not p. 11.
122. Quotation is from p. 294, not p. 293.
123. Quotation is from p. 298, not p. 297.

125. Correct reference is pp. 303-4, not p. 306.


139. Correct reference is pp. 603-4, not p. 603.

OUTSTANDING

**p. 257, para 1.**
Correct reference for 6 September attack needs checking.


110. Correct reference needs checking.

114. Correct reference needs checking.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

TEXT

**P275, para 3, lines 13-14.**
The general in question was not Franz von Roques, commander of the Army Group North rear area, but Karly von Roques, commander of the Army Group South rear area. Hasenclever, *Wehrmachts und Besatzungspolitik in der Sowjetunion*, pp. 193, 211.

**P277, para 1, line 2.**
(indigenous) should be in square brackets as it is not part of the primary source being quoted.

**P279, para 4, lines 5-11.**
The Seventeenth Army actually encountered these conditions from late 1941 onwards. Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, p. 191.

**P279, bottom two lines.**
This figure applies to the end of 1941, not the end of 1942. Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, p. 193.

**P285, para 2, lines 2-3.**
The claim that about a third of all rapes were gang rapes is made by Dieter Pohl, but he qualifies it by stressing the difficulty in arriving at precise figures. Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, p. 132.

**P286, para 2, lines 8-9.**
The correct figure for the population of Smolensk is 37,000, not 30,000. Pohl, *Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht*, p. 131.

NOTES


15. Correct reference is pp. 305-9; ignore other page references in this endnote.


65. Correct reference is pp. 115-16, not p. 115.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

TEXT

**P300, para 1, lines 5-9.**
These other appointments actually took place earlier; senior SS and Police leaders were appointed to Norway and the Netherlands shortly after their conquest, and to Serbia in January 1942. Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 179.

**P300, para 2, line 13.**
Bordeaux, not Auton (transcription error). Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 66.

**P301, para 1, lines 1-2.**
More precisely, the act required those born between 1920 and 1922 to work in Germany (transcription error). Laub, *After the Fall*, p. 259.

**P301, para 1, line 11.**
The correct figure was 638,000. Ibid.

**P303, para 3, lines 9-10.**
It was not the leadership of the broadly-based (though overwhelmingly Communist) FI coalition that was largely wiped out, but that of the Belgian Communist Party specifically and that of its armed wing, the *Partisans Armés* (PA). Conway, *The Sorrows of Belgium*, p. 21.
**P306, para 1, lines 18-19.**
This percentage applied to the period 1 June to 1 September 1942, not the month of September 1942. Happe et al., *Die Verfolgung der europäischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945, Band 12*, p. 507.

**P306, para 2, lines 7-9.**
The furniture van was destined for Malines, not Brussels. The trip should have taken half an hour, but for some reason took three hours. Warmbrunn, *The German Occupation of Belgium 1940–1944*, pp. 152-3.

**P308, para 2, lines 10-13.**
Although all these additional incidents took place in Salonika, they occurred at various points after July 1942. Mazower, *Inside Hitler’s Greece*, pp. 239-40 and 248.

**NOTES**
Chapter title should read ‘Southeast Europe’ rather than ‘Balkans’.

3.

8.
Correct reference is pp. 256-9, not pp. 256-8.

9.
Correct reference is pp. 179-81, not pp. 179-80.

10.
Correct reference is pp. 183-4, not p. 183.

14.
Correct reference is pp. 259-63, not pp. 256-63.

18.
Correct reference is Umbreit, ‘German Rule in the Occupied Territories,’ p. 238, not p. 237.

19.
Correct reference is pp. 228-32, not p. 232.

20.

21.
Correct reference is pp. 37-8, not p. 37.

30.
Correct reference is p. 268, not pp. 168-75.

31.
Correct reference is pp. 232-4, not p. 233.

33.
Correct Longerich reference is pp. 360-1, not pp. 361-3.

35.
Correct reference is p. 230, not pp. 222-3.

43. Correct references are pp. 238-40 and 248, not pp. 238-42.

OUTSTANDING

3. Correct reference needs checking.


CHAPTER SIXTEEN

TEXT

P319, para 3, lines 5-6.

XXXX Corps was also involved. Melvin, Manstein, p. 340.

P322 last line – p323 first line.

The very high degree of motorization across the US Army notwithstanding, half-tracks and self-propelled artillery were not allocated to infantry divisions. Rather, they were allocated to its combined-arms armoured divisions. Within these divisions, half-tracks were used to transport infantry, but this provision was not made fully available until 1944. Hart, Clash of Arms, p. 77.

P324, para 2, line 4.

The correct figure is 1,400, not 1,500. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 92.

P325, para 3, line 7.

The correct figure for lost vehicles is 10,719, not 1,719. O’Brien, How the War Was Won, p. 312.

P326, para 2, lines 3-4.

It is more likely that nearer a third of this 250,000 figure, rather than half, were combat troops. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 105.

P327, para 1, lines 13-15.

Guderian’s support was not unequivocal, but rather, contradictory. While he backed Hitler over expanded Panzer numbers, he also criticized Hitler because the focus on production was creating spare parts shortages. Hart, Guderian, p. 91.

P329, para 1, lines 6-8.

‘Each man was trained not only in his own specialism, but also in that of one his fellow crew members so that he could take over smoothly if needed.’ The first part of this statement is correct, but not the second (transcription error). As Merridale explains, each man was trained for one specialism within the crew. Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 286.

P330, para 3, line 3.

The Second Panzer Army, which was a Panzer army in name only, had only a subsidiary covering role in the battle. Model assumed command of it on 15 July. His own Ninth Army, however, included three Panzer corps during the battle. Melvin, Manstein, p. 365; http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/ArmeenPz/Panzerarmee2.htm, accessed 4.7.16.
Soviet losses in fact exceeded even this. The Red Army may have lost as many as 1,956 tanks and assault guns during Citadel itself, compared with 252 for the Germans. Frieser, ‘Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,’ p. 201.

These numbers are wrong. The Germans lost 252 Panzers and Sturmgeschütze during the battle, but produced 817 new such AFVs in July 1943. They lost over 11,000 dead and missing and over 43,000 wounded during the battle, but replacements in July 1943 for the Eastern Front in general totalled more than 89,000. Frieser, ‘Die Schlacht im Kursker Bogen,’ p. 157.

Palermo featured in several earlier versions of the plan, but eventually the Seventh Army was landed in the south-west, between Gela and Licata, in order to protect the Eighth Army’s left flank. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 169.

Senger-Etterlin was actually Germany liaison officer to the overall Axis ground force commander on Sicily, General Guzzoni of the Italian Sixth Army. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 190.

NOTES

12. Quotation is from p. 342, not p. 343.

13. Correct reference is pp. 344-6, not p. 344.


24. Correct references are pp. 73-4, 76-7, 124-5; not pp. 73, 76-7, 99-100.

25. Correct references are Hart, Clash of Arms, pp. 72, 75-7.

31. This endnote’s page span also covers the first, pre-quotes half of this paragraph.

42. The book title cited in the endnote is published in the form of an omnibus together with two further titles. Somewhat confusingly, the pagination starts from scratch with each new title, so it is necessary to seek out the correct page 41 out of three.


49. Ignore Frieser reference.

54. Correct reference is p. 352, not p. 351.

57. Correct Overy reference is p. 90, not p. 89.

58. Citino, *The Wehrmacht Retreats*, p. 120 also needs citing in this endnote.


73. Correct references are pp. 166-9, 201, not p. 154.


76 and 77. The Toeppel reference in endnote 76 can be ignored. The reference displayed in endnote 77 applies to endnote 76.

81. The quotation ‘A large part…’ is from Senger-Etterlin, *Neither Fear Nor Hope*, p. 148, not p. 150.

85. Correct reference is pp. 196-7, not p. 196.

89. Quotation is from p. 414, not p. 530.

**CHAPTER SEVENTEEN**

**TEXT**

**P343, para 1, lines 9-11.** Kleeman’s objection concerned the shooting of Italian commanders who had failed to order their men to surrender. He was not compelled to shoot them by his superiors, but rather was criticized for his refusal by the senior German naval commander in the Mediterranean, Admiral Kurt Fricke. Even so, the Germans executed fifty Italian military personnel on Rhodes by order of a military court. A further forty were executed without trial. Schreiber, *Deutsche Kriegssverbrechen in Italien*, p. 76.
P343, para 1, lines 11-14.
The wording re Corfu is unclear; the Italians were given the option of surrendering in advance, but chose to resist. This led General Lanz, commander of XXII Mountain Corps, to order the 1st Mountain Division to proceed against the ‘traitors’ ruthlessly. The 1st Mountain Division recorded 700 Italian dead for the operation, whether fallen in battle or ‘shot’ (in other words, killed after capture), for the loss of just five of its own men. Schreiber, Deutsche Kriegsverbrechen in Italien, pp. 86-8.

P346, para 1, lines 3-5.
This is mistakenly displayed as a direct quote from the 16th Panzer Division, but it does accurately convey the order and Förster’s treatment of it. Förster, ‘Ideological Warfare in Germany,’ p. 604.

P347 bottom line – p348 top two lines.
This final point is not one made by Hammermann.

P348, para 4, line 10.
Löhr’s order was restricted to male populations. Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 496.

P353, para 3, line 10.
Mazower puts Italy’s pre-war Jewish population at 50,000, while Klinkhammer provides a figure of 44,000 for the Italian Jewish population in the summer of 1943. As Longerich points out, between 33,000 and 34,000 of these Jews lived in the parts of Italy that the Germans had time to occupy. Mazower, Hitler’s Empire, p. 404; Klinkhammer, Zwischen Bündnis und Besatzung, p. 534; Longerich, Holocaust, p. 400.

NOTES

7.
Correct reference is pp. 79-80, not just p. 79.

9.
Correct reference is p. 86, not p. 87.

23.
Correct reference is pp. 561-2, not p. 561.

25.
Correct Schreiber reference is pp. 804-6, not p. 806.

56.

57.
Correct reference is pp. 253-4, not pp. 252-3.

58.
Correct reference is p. 607, not p. 608.

OUTSTANDING

21.
Correct reference needs checking.
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

TEXT

P361, para 3, line 5.
The correct figure for the war’s end is thirty to one, not thirty-two to one (transcription error). Glantz, Colossus Reborn, p. 285.

P363, para 2, lines 1-4.
The form that was to be completed in support of an application for a decoration had also listed the candidate’s marital status. Leleu, ‘Jenseits der Grenzen,’ p. 31.

P366, para 1, line 2.
Gerlach adds the two to three thousand to the total death toll for the operation, indicating that the mine-clearing activities proved fatal to its participants. Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, p. 902.

P367, para 3, line 12.

P370, para 3, lines 16-18.
Hitler actually reached this decision while Model was still in charge of Army Group North. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 289.

P372, para 2, line 12.
The figure of circa 900,000 (i.e. three times 300,000) included those whom the Germans evacuated and those who felt compelled to flee their homes before being evacuated. Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, p. 325.

P372, para 2, lines 12-14.
The figure for half a million evacuated by Army Group Centre by October 1943 is incorrect. However, by the end of 1943 the Wehrmacht (predominantly the army) had evacuated 885,000 people from its central sector. Pohl does not actually offer a percentage for those who went willingly. Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, pp. 324-5.

P373, para 1, line 9.
The figure was 500 at least. Pohl, Die Herrschaft der Wehrmacht, p. 328.

P375, para 2, line 7.
The correct figure is 22 to 25 per cent, not 20 to 25 per cent (transcription error). The figure relates specifically to Red Army units involved in offensives, and applies to the period from late 1943 up to May 1945 in general rather than to winter months specifically. Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, p. 180.

NOTES

P373, para 2, lines 9-12.
Wording of December order needs double-checking.

6.
Correct reference is p. 440, not p. 240.

7.
Correct reference is Glantz, Colossus Reborn, pp. 86-7.


23. Correct reference is pp. 31-2, not p. 32.


41. Correct reference is pp. 206-9, not p. 206.


57. Quotations are from pp. 144-7, not pp. 144-6.

69. Quotation is from p. 499, not p. 498.

74. Correct reference is p. 371, not p. 373.

76. Correct reference is p. 180, not p. 179.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

TEXT

P376, bottom line.
The 35th actually ran three such camps, not just one. Gerlach, ‘Verbrechen deutscher Fronttruppen in Weißrussland 1941–1944,’ p. 103.

P378, para 2, lines 7-9.
The correct figure is 75,000 by the end of 1942, not 170,000 by the end of 1943. Kroener, ‘Management of Human Resources,’ p. 893.

P378, para 4, lines 4-5
Quotation correctly reads ‘the whole burden of fighting falls on the dwindling number of older men,’ not ‘the whole burden of fighting goes to the older men.’ Kroener, ‘Management of Human Resources,’ p. 902.

P383, para 2, lines 15-16.
The two months in question were August and October 1943, not April and October 1943. Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmachtjustiz, p. 155.
P384, para 2, lines 11-12.
The figure for the British army was 40, not 44 (transcription error). Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmachtjustiz, p. 170.

P391, para 2, lines 11-12.
The split between working class and middle class NCOs in the 253rd Infantry Division was by a factor of circa three to one, not two to one. Rass, ‘The Social Profile of the German Army’s Combat Units,’ p. 750.

NOTES

2. Quotation is from p. 102, not pp. 101-2.


17. Quotation is from p. 902, not p. 914.

24. Quotation is from p. 902, not p. 914.

39. Quotation is from p. 341, not p. 382.

42. Correct reference is p. 485, not pp. 482-5.

44. Additional reference: Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 96.

45. Correct Haase reference is p. 481, not pp. 479-81.

47. Quotation is from p. 477, not p. 476.


49. Correct reference is p. 923, not p. 921.


56. Correct reference is pp. 325-6, not p. 323.


82. Correct reference is pp. 620-1, not pp. 652-3.

84. Quotation is from Bartov, Hitler’s Army, p. 134.

87. Correct Rass references are pp. 742-3 and 750, not p. 743.
98.
Ignore Römer reference.

111.
Correct Neitzel and Welzer reference is p. 278, not p. 178.

OUTSTANDING
13.
Correct reference needs checking.

20.
Correct reference needs checking.

CHAPTER TWENTY

TEXT

P399, para 2, line 11.

P404, para 2, lines 10-16.
The statement that circa 50,000 internees died in addition to those who died in Operation Axis is wrong. The 50,000 figure includes both fatalities in Operation Axis and later fatalities among the internees. The figure for the latter was approximately 25,000, comprising deaths from undernourishment, gruelling working conditions and general hardship. The majority of these 25,000 died in the arms factories in Germany and the Balkans. Hammermann, Zeugnisse der Gefangenschaft, p. 18.

Rather, the Germans in the rear areas did not explicitly acknowledge this reality, but acted as though influenced by it. They often dealt out relatively mild sentences, particularly prison sentences, for illegal possession of firearms, even though such an offence was punishable by death. Gentile, Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg, p. 72.

P406, para 3, line 5.
The numbers need correcting. They eventually peaked in 1945, with insurrections in various northern Italian cities, at between 250,000 and 300,000. Storchi, ‘Italy,’ p. 131.

P407, para 1, line 11.
Quotation should read ‘in all the subsequent fighting,’ not ‘and all the subsequent fighting’.

P412, para 4, lines 1-3.
The total encompasses the period up to the end of March 1945, rather than the end of 1944. Gentile, Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg, p. 353.

P413, para 4, line 1.
The infantry division in question was the 94th, not the 194th.

P414, para 2, lines 3-5.
According to Gentile, there are only two other recorded instances of the 26th Panzer Division killing civilians. On these two occasions a total of five civilians were killed. Gentile, Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg, p. 381.
P414, para 3, line 5.
The relevant point of comparison here is not the Hermann Göring Division, but the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division ‘Reichsführer-SS’. Gentile, Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg, p. 389.

P414, para 4.
The 26th Panzer Division’s commander at the time of the massacre, Colonel Eduard Crasemann, served on the eastern front between April 1943 and June 1944. However, the 26th as a whole did not serve on the eastern front. The 94th Infantry Division suffered more grievously at Cassino than either of the other two divisions, though all three divisions were certainly engaged in extensive and heavy fighting prior to the major massacres they committed during the summer of 1944. It should be noted, however, that troops of the Hermann Göring Division had also committed smaller-scale massacres of civilians during the spring of 1944. Gentile, Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS im Partisanenkrieg, pp. 307-20, 371, 379, 383-4.

P414, para 4, line 4.
The infantry division in question was the 94th, not the 194th.

NOTES

12.
Correct reference is p. 274, not pp. 275-7.

13.
Ignore Ellis reference. Correct reference is McNab, Hitler’s Armies, p. 287.

19.
Correct reference is p. 85, not pp. 84-5.

20.
Correct Bull reference is p. 146, not pp. 134-46.

31.
Correct reference is pp. 405-6, not p. 405.

33.

34.

45.

73.

76.
Correct reference is p. 352, not pp. 353-6.

83.
Quotation is from p. 390, not p. 389.

85.
Correct reference is p. 24 only, not pp. 24-32.
OUTSTANDING

**P402, para 2.**
Details of Vietinhghoff’s measures need checking.

29.
Figures for war expenditure and Italian workers in Germany need checking.

68.
Correct reference needs checking.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

TEXT

**P429, para 2, line 6.**
‘Midget submarines’ rather than ‘frogmen’. Beevor, *D-Day*, p. 76. The U-boats were unable actually to penetrate the Channel, despite their efforts, though the Kriegsmarine did also make a couple of isolated attacks using torpedo boats. Ibid.; Lieb, *Unternehmen Overlord*, p. 87.

**P430, para 1, line 7.**
The correct figure was 150,00, including troops who had been landed by air. Lieb, *Unternehmen Overlord*, p. 88.

**P430, para 3, line 7.**
The 880,000 figure refers not to the numbers of German military personnel committed to the Normandy campaign, but to German strength across France, Belgium and the Netherlands on 1 June 1944. But this emphasizes even more strongly the Germans’ inability to contain the Allies. Zetterling, *Normandy 1944*, p. 107.

NOTES

3.
Correct reference is pp. 151-2, not pp. 51-2.

8.
Correct reference is pp. 67-8, not p. 67.

13.
Correct reference is pp. 18-19, not p. 16.

21.
Quotation is from p. 264, not p. 263.

25.

27.

30.
Ignore Lieb reference.

31.
Correct reference is p. 138, not p. 137.

35.
Correct Overy reference is pp. 154-6, not pp. 154-7.
36. 
Correct reference is pp. 50-1, not p. 50.

38. 
Additional reference: Vogel, ‘German and Allied Conduct of the War in the West,’ pp. 589-90.

39. 
Correct reference is pp. 84-5, not p. 84.

48. 
Correct reference is p. 367, not pp. 365-9.

OUTSTANDING

26. 
Reference for French agriculture point needs checking.

38. 
Correct reference needs checking.

41. 
Correct reference needs checking.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

TEXT

P443, para 1, lines 1-2.
This point is incorrectly attributed to Buckley, though it is certainly consistent with his arguments as to why historians’ views of the battle of Normandy have arguably been somewhat skewed.

P444, para 1, lines 9-13.
The figure of 19,000 needs breaking down as follows: Lieb estimates that between 13 and 14,000 were killed by Allied bombing, but that the remainder were killed by Allied or German artillery fire. Lieb, Unternehmen Overlord, p. 50.

P446, para 3, line 12.
Ignore number ‘seven’ (transcription error).

P447, para 4, lines 11-14.
The last two complete sentences on this page closely and inadvertently paraphrase Stargardt, The German War, p. 433.

P449, para 3.
Some corrections and clarifications need making to the course of events described in this paragraph. In outline, Model actually deployed his limited forces in counter-attacks as far east as Wilna, and received some limited reinforcements in the course of them. Zhukov certainly harboured the cited grandiose ambitions for the southern offensive, conducted by Rokossovsky’s First Belarusian Front and Konev’s First Ukrainian Front from mid-July onwards. But Stalin initially overruled Zhukov, envisaging more limited objectives directly westward in southern Poland. Only on 27 July did Stalin authorize part of the First Belarusian Front to turn northwards towards Warsaw, along the lines Zhukov had been arguing for. By then it was too late, for the delay gave Model time to marshal enough forces to defeat that attack before Warsaw in early August. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 324-9; Frieser, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der Heeresgruppe Mitte im Sommer 1944, pp. 563-87, 602-3.
P449, para 4, lines 1-2.
The correct figure was 350,000, not 300,000. Keegan, *The Second World War*, p. 403.

P458, para 2, line 5.
The unit in question was the 709th Infantry Division, not the 719th. Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?*, p. 433.

P459, para 1, line 7.
The direct translation from the German is ‘can lead’ (*kann führen*). As this translates awkwardly into English, it was decided to translate it as ‘will lead’ rather than ‘could lead’.

P461, para 1, line 10.
Lieb cites a figure of between 250,000 and 300,000 for the entire force. Lieb, *Unternehmen Overlord*, p. 166.

P461, para 3, line 8.
The Germans feared maltreatment or death at the hands of the Free French forces of the Interior, in other words resistance forces, rather than regular Free French troops. Here, they were mindful of the Germans’ own brutal conduct against maquis fighters and civilians during German anti-partisan operations. Vogel, ‘German and Allied Conduct of the War in the West,’ p. 660.

P463, para 2, lines 3-5.
Hitler’s intention, in his order to Choltitz of 20 August, was that ‘Paris must not fall into enemy hands, except as a field of rubble.’ Using explosives to destroy the entire city was not the aim. However, five days later Hitler ordered the extensive demolition of tower blocks and use of the Luftwaffe against resistance in the city. Lieb, *Unternehmen Overlord*, pp. 60-1. Choltitz’s lack of troops was a fundamental problem primarily because it prevented him from defending the city or maintaining control within it; this in itself precluded carrying out extensive demolitions.

P464, para 2.
Coordination between Army Group South Ukraine and the Sixth Army was also poor. Schönherr, ‘Die Rückzugskämpfe in Rümanien und Siebenbürgen im Sommer/Herbst 1944,’ p. 811.

P464, para 3, lines 2-4.
Rather, IV Corps was not informed about XXIX Corps’ planned counterattack, and was too preoccupied trying to hold its own sector. Schönherr, ‘Die Rückzugskämpfe in Rümanien und Siebenbürgen im Sommer/Herbst 1944,’ pp. 813-14.

NOTES


15. This endnote should be at end of paragraph.

19. Correct reference is p. 6, not p. 4.

20. Buckley reference should be p. 107, not p. 94.
24. Quotation is from p. 118, not p. 119.
27. Correct Lieb reference is pp. 337-45, not pp. 337-44.
34. Allied killing of German prisoners was not restricted to the Americans. On the Canadians, see Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?*, pp. 165-6.
46. Correct reference is pp. 120-1, not p. 121.
54. Correct references are pp. 181-2, 201, not pp. 180-2, 199.
72. Quotation is from p. 426, not p. 427.
108. Correct Lieb reference is pp. 414-15; ignore all other Lieb references in this endnote.
121. Correct reference is p. 45, not p. 43.
122. Quotation is from p. 341, not p. 340.
124. Quotation is from p. 173, not p. 171.
126.
Correct reference is pp. 161-2, not p. 162.

130.
Correct Vogel reference is p. 610, not p. 609.

131.
Correct reference is pp. 168-70, not p. 170.

138.
Quotation is from p. 161, not p. 162.

142.
Correct Lieb reference is pp. 474-7; ignore all other Lieb references in this endnote.

146.
Correct Mawdsley reference is p. 329, not p. 326.

148.
Correct reference is pp. 808-15, not pp. 808-12.

149.
Correct reference is pp. 814-15, not p. 815. This endnote should be at the end of the sentence ending with ‘its own troops’ utter exhaustion’. On the political situation in Romania at the time, see Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, pp. 342-3.

153.
Ignore this endnote.

OUTSTANDING

P454, para 3.
Need to check whether 1 August order originally came from Blaskowitz or the OKW.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

TEXT

P470, para 3, line 8.
The correct spelling is ‘Reinecke’.

P472, para 3, line 3.
Speech marks should not be used for the phrase ‘terrifying disciplinarian’. Although the phrase encapsulates Kershaw’s view of Schörner, it is not a direct quotation.

P473, para 2, line 12.
The reference to wild parties was added by accident; Kershaw does not mention these.

P477, top line.
Quote should read ‘in this theatre of war,’ not ‘in the state of war’ (transcription error).

P479, para 2, line 8.
This should read ‘Bohemia,’ not ‘Bavaria’.

P481, para 2.
This particular attack was against the right wing of Army Group North rather than the left wing of Army Group Centre. Frieser, ‘Die Rückzugskämpfe der Heeresgruppe Nord bis Kurland’, p. 644.
**P484, para 2, line 2.**
The correct account is that the Germans and Americans fought over Bergstein between 3 and 6 December. The particular assault in question took place on the morning of 6 December. Nash, *Victory Was beyond their Grasp*, pp. 81-98.

**P484, para 3, line 3.**
The original number of men was 520, not 528. Ibid., p. 92.

**P484, para 3, line 6.**
The correct beginning of the quotation is ‘The company had no time after taking up this position to dig fighting positions on an open slope.’ Ibid., quotation from p. 110.

**P485, para 1, line 6.**
These figures are incorrect. On 3 August 1944, Kesselring commanded twenty-nine divisions, together with an additional brigade and regiment to the Allied Fifteenth Army Group’s twenty divisions. However, the Allies had more armoured divisions and six additional armoured brigades. Schreiber, *Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs und der Krieg in Italien,* p. 1153.

**P489, paras 2-3.**
The order cited in para 2 was actually issued on 2 November. This was the order that the Nineteenth Army was protesting against. L Army Corps and Wehrkreis V were protesting against an earlier albeit similar order. This earlier order was issued on 30 September, and L Army Corps and Wehrkreis V protested against it in early October. In both cases, Army Group G responded by softening the order in certain respects. Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?*, pp. 495-6.

**P490, para 2, lines 11-13.**
Montgomery did however order a limited thrust as far as Utrecht, ‘up to which’ in his words ‘full relief could be undertaken and WEST of which only partial relief would be possible.’ More generally, the British hoped that the Allied thrust against the Rhine would help the Dutch indirectly, by compelling the Germans to withdraw troops from the Netherlands in order to defend the Rhine. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45’, p. 357.

**P491, para 3, lines 3-4.**
The Allies most expected an attack east of Aachen, rather than in Alsace. Vogel, ‘German and Allied Conduct of the War in the West,’ p. 687.

**P492, para 1, lines 6-7.**
Model sought an encirclement around Liège, not Aachen, whereas Rundstedt sought a different ‘small solution’ through a two-pronged attack. Stein, *A Flawed Genius*, pp. 174-5.

**NOTES**

**13.**
Correct reference is p. 655, not p. 656.

**14.**

**27.**
Correct reference is pp. 266-8, not pp. 266-7.

**30.**
61. Quotation is from p. 9, not p. 8.
73. Correct reference is pp. 215-17, not pp. 215-16.
92. Correct Ellis reference is p. 91, not p. 147.
94. Correct Ellis reference is p. 91, not p. 147. Ignore Wettstein reference.
98. Correct reference is pp. 90-3, not pp. 90-2. Quotation is from p.93, not p. 91.
100. Quotations are on pp. 110 and 111, not p. 110 solely.
104. Correct Ellis reference is p. 142, not p. 141.
120. Ignore this endnote.
122. Quotation is from p. 1002, not p. 1003.
136 and 137. Correct Vogel reference is p. 683, not p. 682.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

TEXT

P498, para 1, lines 10-12. This observation is inadvertently attributed to Kunz, though it is consistent with his overall argument.
P498, para 2, line 7.
Quote should read ‘men with ear ailments,’ not ‘men with ailments’ (transcription error).

P499, para 2, lines 4-6.
Army Group A was also hit by the Soviet offensive on the Vistula; the German strengths outlined here incorporate both army groups.

P500, para 1, line 2.

P500, para 3, lines 1-3.
Army Group Vistula was a newly constituted formation, but Army Groups A and Centre continued to exist. From 25 January, however, the upheaval caused by the Soviet offensive led to a re-designation of some German army groups. Army Group A became Army Group Centre, Army Group Centre became Army Group North, and Army Group North became Army Group Courland. Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, p. 524.

P500, para 4, line 12.
167,000 was the figure for Soviet losses in these operations; German losses were 60,000. Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, p. 586.

P500, para 5 – p. 501, line 1.
Schörner’s exhortations to his troops themselves varied between the upbeat and the terrifying. Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, p. 577.

P501, para 2, lines 6-8.
This is the figure for Rokossovsky’s total losses during this period, not just his losses against Danzig. Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, p. 561.

P501, para 4, line 13.
The Germans’ praise for the Moroccan troops was higher than for French colonial troops generally. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 295.

P502, para 1, lines 4-5
Franco-American progress was not this rapid. As late as 10 March, they had not yet reached the section of the Lower Rhine between Mainz and Karlsruhe. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 388.

P502, para 4, lines 10-11.
This is a description not of the 416th, but of the units manning the section of front between Emmerich and Düsseldorf. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 315.

P505, para 2, lines 5-8.
The exact respective figures are 62, 21 and 7 per cent. Kershaw, The End, p. 260.

P506, para 3, line 9.
This order was issued on 2 February 1945, not January 1945. Lakowski, ‘Der Zusammenbruch der deutschen Verteidigung zwischen Ostsee und Karpaten’, p. 541.
P508, para 3, line 10.
Montgomery refers not to ‘base units’ but to ‘bath units’. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 286.

P508, para 3, line 17.
Correct spelling in this context is ‘dikes’, not ‘dykes’.

P509, para 2, line 7.
The cadets in Ibbenburen were armed with rifles, not Panzerfausts, though the general point about the Panzerfaust still stands. Ellis, The Sharp End, p. 90.

P509, para 3, lines 4-5.
The second sentence here is incorrectly displayed as a quotation, when it is indeed a paraphrasing of Hitler’s words. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 326.

P509, para 4, line 13.
Quote should read ‘36 Po ferries,’ not ‘36 point ferries’ (transcription error).

P512, para 1, line 11.
The link-up took place west, not north-east, of Potsdam. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 392.

P512, para 2, line 7.
The division was actually devastated by a combination of British and American land forces, and Allied aerial bombardment, during its movements throughout April. Zimmermann, ‘Die deutsche Militärkriegführung im Westen 1944/45,’ p. 445.

P513, top line.
The correct date is 26 April, not 21 April. Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, p. 286, note 644.

P513, para 4, line 3.
More accurately, in Kershaw’s words, ‘The assigned “combat commandant” was personally responsible for ensuring that the defence of the town was carried out. Anyone acting against this order, or any official seeking to hinder the commandant in fulfilling his duty, would be sentenced to death.’ Kershaw, The End, quotation from p. 323.

P514, para 1, lines 7-11.
This order actually came from Himmler, though an order from Schulz indicates that he identified with its sentiments. Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage, pp. 237-8.

P516, para 2, line 7.
‘King Tiger’ was an alternative name for the Tiger II.

P518, para 1, line 2.
The 78,000 figure is for total losses, rather than fatalities only. Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, p. 392.

NOTES

2.

11.
Correct references are pp. 196 and 202, not pp. 195, 202 and 206.

16. Quotation is from p. 197, not p. 176.

22. Endnote should be placed at end of previous sentence.


35. Quotations are from p. 243 only.

40. Ignore Kunz references.


47. Quotation is from Kershaw, The End, p. 219.

49. Ignore Kershaw reference.


58. Correct reference is pp. 784-6, not pp. 785-6.


63. Correct references are pp. 90, 129 and 139-40, not pp. 138-41.

68. Correct reference is pp. 300-1, not p. 301.

70. Correct Kershaw reference is pp. 303-5, not p. 303.


85. Correct reference is p. 323, not p. 320.

93. Correct reference is pp. 343-4, not p. 343.

102.
Correct reference is pp. 323-6, not pp. 323-4.

105.

106.
Correct reference is p. 659, not pp. 657-8.

110.
Correct reference is pp. 396-400, not pp. 386-400. What is presented on p. 518 of the current book is not Kershaw’s own specific argument, but it is informed by points that he makes.

111.

113.
Correct reference is p. 358, not p. 356.

114.
Correct references are pp. 484-9, not pp. 486 and 491.

OUTSTANDING

P500, para 4, line 11.
Need to double check references for these counter-attacks, but it appears they are referred to mistakenly here.

20.
Correct reference for 59-division strength needs checking.

48.
Correct reference for Rendulic’s March 1945 order needs checking.

113.
Correct reference for Schörner’s alleged Alpine redoubt motivation needs checking.

CONCLUSION

TEXT

P534, para 1, line 5.
The 67,000 figure for 1940 is incorrect. Overmans provides the figure of 76,000 army dead in 1939 and 1940. Overmans, Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, p. 270.